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Abstract 
Research summary: we examine how the interplay between executive temporal depth (time 
horizons that executives consider when contemplating past and future events) and industry 
velocity (the rate at which new opportunities emerge and disappear in an industry) shapes 
competitive aggressiveness (a firm’s propensity to challenge rivals directly and intensely in order 
to maintain or improve its market position) and firm performance. Based on panel data (from 
1995 to 2000) from 258 firms in 23 industries, we found that executive temporal depth exhibited 
different patterns of relationships with competitive aggressiveness in low- and high-velocity 
industries. Moreover, competitive aggressiveness had a positive main effect on firm performance 
but this effect was stronger in high-velocity industries than in low-velocity industries. 
Managerial summary: This article informs that the executive past and future time horizons 
needed to enhance competitive aggressiveness and performance in fast changing and slow 
changing industries are different. Our results show that in fast changing industries, executives 
with short-term thinking about the past and moderate-term thinking about the future maximize 
competitive aggressiveness and performance of their firms. In contrast, in slow changing 
environments, executives with long-term past and long-term future thinking achieve superior 
competitive aggressiveness and firm performance.  
Keywords: Competitive dynamics, temporal orientation, executive cognition, and competitive 
aggressiveness 
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Based on the Austrian view of the market as a disequilibrium system (Kirzner, 1997), competitive 
dynamics research rests on the premise that changing conditions render a firm’s positioning in a 
competitive market temporary either in the short run or the long run (Chen and Miller, 1994; 
D’Aveni, Dagnino and Smith, 2010; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm, 1999). This 
inherently temporal nature of competitive phenomena has brought the issue of time to the forefront 
of research on competitive dynamics. This research has identified two sets of temporal forces 
governing the creation and erosion of competitive advantage —macro and micro. Industry-level 
macro temporal forces (e.g., hypercompetition, dynamism and velocity) define the time windows of 
opportunities available for incumbents to establish new advantages and negate the advantages of 
competitors and impose different levels of pressure on incumbents to retaliate (Chen et al., 2010b; 
D’Aveni et al., 2010; Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2009; Katila, Chen, and Piezunka, 2012; 
Rindova, Ferrier, and Wiltbank, 2010). Micro temporal forces, in the form of speed, intensity, 
timing and sequences of actions taken by individual firms, determine their competitive advantages 
over rivals and in turn their survival and success (Derfus et al., 2008; Ferrier, 2001). Firms that take 
speedy and frequent competitive actions are better positioned competitively and show superior 
performance (Katila and Chen, 2008; Rindova et al., 2010). 
Despite the rich insights yielded by this literature, several gaps remain in our understanding 
of how time manifests in competitive dynamics. A particularly prominent gap pertains to the limited 
understanding of how executives’ temporal orientations (relatively stable tendencies in evaluating 
and interpreting time) shape competitive behaviors. This gap is especially important because 
competitive dynamics scholars recognize that “competitive actions can be seen as products of the 
perceptions… of (competitive) actors in an organization” (Chen and Miller, 2012: 29). Building on 
the upper echelons perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), this research emphasizes that 
executive orientations create filters in how they notice and interpret competitive cues and in turn 
determine a firm’s overall propensity to initiate new and responsive actions (Chen and Miller, 2012). 
Studies have shown that cognitive categorization of competitors (Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller, 
1989; Reger and Huff, 1993), competitor acumen (Tsai, Su and Chen, 2011), cognitive frameworks 
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(Marcel, Barr and Duhaime, 2011) and perceived competitive tension (Chen, Su, and Tsai, 2007) 
explain additional variance beyond that caused by industry and firm factors. 
Research on the subjective perspective of time in strategy has also stressed that executives’ 
temporal orientations mold expectations and evaluations of decision situations and form the basis of 
executives’ strategic choices (Ancona et al., 2001; Bluedorn, 2002; Das, 1987). Studies have shown 
that temporal heuristics and preferences used by managers in sequencing and pacing activities are 
critical to capturing new opportunities, becoming informed of external environmental changes and 
adjusting firm strategies to these changes (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011; Gersick, 1994). This 
research suggests that executives’ temporal orientation likely serves as a third temporal force in 
determining competitive behaviors of firms.  
We address this gap by examining the role of executive temporal orientation in driving 
competitive behaviors of firms. We capture executive temporal orientation by the concept of 
temporal depth, which refers to the temporal distance into the past and the future that executives 
typically consider when contemplating events that have happened or may happen (Bluedorn, 2002; 
Bluedorn and Martin, 2008). Time horizons are fundamental aspects of a firm’s strategic orientation 
(Das, 1987). Short time horizons provide flexibility and quick adaptation but also give rise to 
temporal myopia and economic short-termism (Laverty, 1996; Marginson and McCaulay, 2008). 
Long time horizons lend foresight in management but delay short-term adaptation to changing 
environmental conditions (Levinthal and March, 1993; Miller, 2002). Therefore, variation in 
consideration of time horizons has implications for strategic choices (Laverty, 1996; Marginson and 
McAulay, 2008; Souder and Bromiley, 2012).  
Anecdotal examples show that executives vary in their temporal depth orientation, which 
guides their strategic philosophy. A Financial times article in 2009 described Jack Welsh, CEO of 
GE, as the “father of the (short-term) shareholder value movement.” Dowd and Hutchinson (2010: 
150) explain how “Jack Welsh used short-term results to determine bottom ranking 10 percent of 
managers each year so he could fire them.” In contrast, the following quotes from Costco CEO 
James Sinegal’s interviews illustrate his long-term orientation: 
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“I think the biggest single thing that causes difficulty in the business world is the short-term 
view. We become obsessed with it. But it forces bad decisions” – (Ethix, 2003)  
“Wall Street is in the business of making money between now and next Tuesday. We're in the 
business of building an organization, an institution that we hope will be here 50 years from 
now.” – (The Motley Fool, 2013) 
This long temporal depth has defined Costco’s strategic philosophy of treating employees as a 
future investment (e.g., paying higher wages and benefits and opportunities for growth) and 
focusing on long-term customer loyalty (e.g., membership programs) rather than short-term sales.  
We propose that the relationship between executive temporal depth, competitive behaviors 
and firm performance will be moderated by industry velocity, defined as the rate at which new 
opportunities emerge and disappear in an industry (Davis et al., 2009; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000). By determining how quickly technologies, products and competitive actions become 
obsolete in an industry, industry velocity sets the competitive clock for incumbent firms to act and 
react. Therefore, we contend that a match between executive temporal depth and the wavelength 
implied by industry velocity (short vs long duration of competitive change cycles) will enhance 
competitive behaviors and in turn firm performance, whereas a mismatch between the two will 
undermine both. We conceptualize competitive behaviors as competitive aggressiveness, a 
fundamental concept capturing inter-firm rivalry (Chen et al., 2010a). It is defined as “the 
propensity of a firm to directly and intensely challenge rivals in order to maintain or improve its 
market position” (Yu, Subramaniam, and Cannella, 2009: 128). We test this model using panel data 
(1995 – 2000) on 258 firms from 23 industries.  
This study advances existing research in two ways. First, it extends research on time in 
competitive dynamics by introducing a third temporal force—executives’ temporal orientation. This 
subjective perspective of time complements research on both industry-level (macro) temporal forces 
and firm-level (micro) competitive behaviors. By integrating research on the three temporal forces, 
this study presents a more complete understanding of how time manifests in competitive dynamics. 
Second, whereas strategy research has focused almost exclusively on future time horizons, we 
examine the impact of both past and future time horizons on competitive behaviors and firm 
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performance. By highlighting the distinct relationships of executive past and future time horizons to 
competitive aggressiveness in varied industry velocity contexts, this study presents a more fine-
grained conceptualization of time horizons in strategy.  
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Research on time in competitive dynamics 
Competitive dynamics research has identified two temporal forces—macro and micro. Macro 
temporal forces are temporal features of the environment that serve as time givers and determine the 
degree to which the competitive advantage enjoyed by incumbent firms is temporary or sustainable 
(Miller and Chen, 1996; Derfus et al., 2008). Several temporal features of the environment have 
been identified, including hypercompetition (Chen et al., 2010a; D’Aveni et al., 2010; Thomas and 
D’Aveni, 2009), industry velocity (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), industry dynamism (Davis et al., 
2009), market uncertainty (Chen and Miller, 1994) and nascent versus established industries (Chen 
et al., 2010b; Katila et al., 2012; Rindova et al., 2010). Micro temporal forces are reflected in the 
actions taken by individual firms in creating and pursuing new opportunities. Temporal features of 
firm actions, such as speed, timing, volume and unpredictability, have been shown to influence firm 
performance (Ferrier, 2001; Katila and Chen, 2008; Rindova et al., 2010). 
A key notion of this research is that macro (industry-level) and micro (firm-level) temporal 
forces interact in shaping inter-firm rivalry. Because the competitive rules of success and the 
temporal contingencies facing incumbent firms are unique to an industry, performance benefits that 
firms derive from action attributes such as speed and volume depend on the temporal features of the 
industry (Chen and Miller, 1994; Derfus et al., 2008; Ferrier, 2001). Chen et al. (2010b) and Katila 
et al. (2012) found that the frequency and type (exploratory and exploitative) of R&D and market 
moves yielded different levels of firm performance in new and established markets. Similarly, Chen 
et al. (2010a) found that action speed and volume were more strongly associated with superior 
performance in fast-changing, hypercompetitive industries than in slow-changing industries. Finally, 
Rindova et al. (2010) found that simple and predictable sequences of competitive moves received 
higher investor evaluation in nascent industries.      
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 Together, this research highlights that both firm and industry temporal forces are central to 
determining competitive behaviors and outcomes. We add to this existing body of literature by 
theorizing that subjective perspective of time is likely to serve as a third temporal force in shaping 
the creation and erosion of competitive advantage.   
Subjective perspective of time in competitive dynamics 
Drawing on the upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), competitive dynamics studies 
have stressed the subjective basis of competitive behaviors. As top managers sift through and 
reconcile large amounts of incomplete, ambiguous and conflicting data, their orientations and 
perceptions enter greatly into the decision to undertake a competitive action (Chen and Miller, 2012; 
Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996). This literature has identified executive awareness as a key driver 
of problem sensing, interpretation and enactment of environmental cues, and in turn of competitive 
behaviors (Marcel et al., 2011). Perceptual filters enhance or inhibit executives’ awareness of the 
relevant cues in the competitive environment and determine the degree to which executives can 
accurately gauge critical threats and opportunities and match perceived problems with strategic 
solutions (Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 2001). As Chen et al. (2007: 103-104) state “Indeed, the perceptions 
of decision makers …—the level of competitive apprehension or anticipation they feel as they 
observe, filter, and act on competitive information—inform the way a firm acts (strategically or 
competitively) on those perceptions.” Porac and Thomas (1990: 228) also explain how “decision 
makers make sense of competitive environments by developing cognitive taxonomies that 
summarize the similarities and differences among (rival) organizations.” Similarly, Livengood and 
Reger (2010) emphasized that how the firm sees itself and its domain in the competitive arena can 
help explain why firms act and react the way they do. Strategists’ inaccurate assumptions about the 
competitive landscape create blind spots or judgmental impairment, prompting them to overlook the 
emergence of a new rival (Chen & Miller, 2012).  
Empirical evidence supports the subjective nature of inter-firm rivalry. Porac et al. (1989) 
found that Scottish knitwear manufacturers varied in their definition of competitors and criteria for 
competing. Reger and Huff (1993) showed that incumbent firms clustered competitors based on 
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their perceptions of shared strategic commonalities among rivals. Recent studies have found that 
executives’ competitor acumen (Tsai et al., 2011), perceived competitive tension (Chen et al., 2007) 
and cognitive frameworks (Marcel et al., 2011) drive competitive behaviors and outcomes.  
However, this literature has not addressed executives’ temporal orientation. This gap is 
especially important because strategy scholars increasingly emphasize that strategic decisions are 
made by individual strategy makers whose temporal orientation cannot be ignored because such 
omitting provides “a misleading conception of time when it relates to strategy making” (Das, 2004: 
59). According to this view, executives mentally create their own “temporal zones” (e.g., short-term 
versus long-term) when deciding on strategic actions, irrespective of the actual environment they 
face (Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999; Huy, 2001). These temporal orientations serve as temporal 
filters that mold expectations and evaluations of decision situations and form the basis of choices 
related to resource allocation and prioritization, as well as recognition of the timing and urgency of 
strategic activities (Das, 1987). Drawing on this research, we argue that executives’ temporal 
orientations will serve as filters that shape which competitive stimuli executives selectively perceive 
and which stimuli they ignore, and as how they interpret the noticed stimuli, which in turn 
influences competitive behaviors. We examine the relationships between executives’ temporal 
depth, competitive aggressiveness and firm performance. 
Executive temporal depth and competitive aggressiveness 
Research in psychology has identified several facets of people’s temporal orientation, defined as 
inherent, persistent, and relatively stable tendencies in evaluating and interpreting time (Bluedorn, 
2002; Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). Studies in this stream have made significant progress in 
identifying and validating specific forms of temporal orientations such as time perspective 
(Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999) and temporal depth (Bluedorn, 2002). These temporal orientations hold 
considerable promise for sharpening the temporal lens and advancing theory and research on the 
subjective view of time in strategy (Ancona et al., 2001). Recently, Nadkarni and Chen (2014) 
found that CEO temporal focus (the degree to which CEOs characteristically devote attention to the 
past, present and future time frames) influenced rate of new product introductions. 
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We examine a unique form of temporal orientation not addressed in previous research—
temporal depth, which refers to the temporal distance (or time horizons) into the past and the future 
that executives typically consider when contemplating events that have happened or may happen 
(Bluedorn, 2002; Bluedorn and Martin, 2008). Temporal depth is especially relevant to the context 
of strategy because time horizons are fundamental aspects of a firm’s strategic orientation (Das, 
1987) and influence a broad range of strategic behaviors such as technological and capital 
investments (Laverty, 1996; Marginson and McAulay, 2008; Souder and Bromiley, 2012). Katila 
and Chen (2008) found that the time horizon of search (early versus late) determined the frequency 
and innovativeness of new products introduced by the firm. Das (1987) found that executives in the 
same industry differed in their subjective time horizons, and these differences influenced the time 
horizons they considered in strategic planning. However, much of this research has examined 
mostly future time horizons. Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) argued that both backward and forward 
looking searches are essential to strategic adaptation. Temporal depth provides a comprehensive 
framework for understanding how time horizons considered in strategic decisions can stem from 
executives’ innate orientation towards temporal distance into the past as well as the future. 
Temporal depth subsumes two distinct dimensions, past temporal depth (PTD) and future 
temporal depth (FTD), each of which is associated with different information processing filters 
(Bluedorn, 2002). PTD, which captures how far back executives tend to go when considering past 
events (Bluedorn and Martin, 2008), has both pros and cons for decision-making. On the positive 
side, a long past temporal depth promotes a deeper understanding of the past and increases the 
chances of matching current situations with relevant lessons from prior situations to solve current 
problems quickly (Bluedorn, 2002; Clark and Collins, 1993). With the passage of time, events and 
situations become more understandable and explicable in terms of normative, situational, and 
objective forces (Taylor and Fiske, 1978). Whereas “people may have trouble seeing the forest for 
the trees’ for near-past events and situations, the passage of time allows one to take a cognitive step 
back and view the larger canvas” (Miller and Porter, 1980: 537-538). Strategy researchers have also 
argued that cumulative past experience built through repeated observations and actions provides a 
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deeper understanding of the technological and market context and reduces errors and false starts in 
initiating actions such as new product introductions (Helfat, 1997; Katila, 2002). At the same time, 
a long PTD can filter out critical aspects of the current context and prompt executives to consider 
distant past cues that may no longer be relevant. Such consideration of outdated information can 
inject errors and backtracking into evaluations of strategic alternatives (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1997). Nerkar (2003) advocated the virtues of “recency” in avoiding errors and competence traps 
that can hamper creation of new knowledge. 
FTD--how far ahead executives tend to look when considering the future—is also 
considered a double-edged sword in decision making (Bluedorn, 2002). A long FTD promotes 
“pattern recognition,” the ability to visualize long-term future changes that are not easily visible in 
the short run (Strathman et al., 1994). Such pattern visualization increases executives’ awareness of 
distant future developments and allows them to make a priori investments to prepare for such 
developments. Executives with a short FTD may fail to foresee and prepare for potential future 
environmental opportunities and threats in advance (Bluedorn, 2002; Bluedorn and Martin, 2008). 
Strategy scholars also contend that the tendency to look into the long run can enhance 
competitiveness of firms in the marketplace by promoting foresight of management and by allowing 
managers to meticulously prepare for future developments (Miller, 2002). Overlooking the distant 
future can result in temporal myopia and short-termism, which prompt investment in technological 
and market opportunities that yield quick returns in the short run but can damage future competitive 
advantages of the firm (Chen and Miller, 2012, forthcoming; Laverty, 1996; Levinthal and March, 
1993; Marginson and MacCaulay, 2008). However, a long FTD can make executives 
overcommitted to long-term goals and undermine their ability to adjust to critical short-term 
changes. Such hesitance to deviate from the long-term vision can create rigidities that can blind 
managers to changes in the short-term environmental conditions and create inertia in adapting to 
these changes (Levinthal and March, 1993). 
We argue that executive temporal depth will create temporal filters that influence executives’ 
awareness of the temporal significance of the competitive landscape and their consideration of 
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competitive alternatives, in turn shaping competitive behaviors of firms. Specifically, we focus on 
the influence of executive temporal depth on a firm’s competitive aggressiveness, which has 
emerged as a fundamental concept capturing inter-firm rivalry. Competitive aggressiveness reflects 
the degree to which a firm engages intensely with its rivals through its competitive repertoires, 
which are a set of market actions (e.g., price changes, product line or service alterations) used by a 
firm in a given year to proactively get ahead of rivals and to respond to rivals’ actions (Yu et al., 
2009). These action repertoires lie at the core of competitive aggressiveness and lend a holistic 
understanding of the approaches that competing firms stake in vying against one another (Chen et 
al., 2010a). A firm is said to have a high degree of competitive aggressiveness “if it has rapidly 
taken a large number of actions. The integrated consideration of both action volume and speed is 
essential for revealing the nuance of temporary advantage” (Chen et al., 2010a: 1413). 
Aggressiveness allows firms to proactively seize new opportunities ahead of rivals and to shorten 
the duration of advantages enjoyed by rivals. By undertaking more actions (volume) and acting 
more quickly in the wake of rivals’ moves (speed), firms can proactively address the time-
dependent nature of competitive advantage (Andrevski, Brass and Ferrier, forthcoming; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Ferrier, 2001). Therefore, time-sensitive elements of competitive behaviors lie at the heart of 
competitive aggressiveness. As Chen et al. (2010a: 1413) advocate, competitive aggressiveness 
“represents a fine-grained investigation at the micro firm-behavior level.” 
The relationships of PTD and FTD with competitive aggressiveness are likely tenuous 
because of the opposing mechanisms associated with them. PTD may promote aggressiveness by 
providing a deeper awareness of the broad historical competitive trends but may also hinder it by 
prompting executives to consider distant past cues that may no longer be relevant and by hampering 
their awareness of the nuances of the current competitive context. Similarly, FTD may enhance 
competitive aggressiveness by inducing executives to detect long-term competitive patterns and 
prepare for distant future developments ahead of competitors but may also inhibit aggressiveness by 
undermining executives’ awareness of short-term changes. A potential resolution to the question of 
whether PTD and FTD enhance or inhibit competitive aggressiveness is examination of the 
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environmental conditions within which executives operate, a point to which we now turn.  
The role of industry velocity 
“One of the hallmarks of strategy research is that relationships are typically contingent (i.e., it 
depends)”(Carpenter, 2002: 276). The contingency perspective in strategy has long recognized that 
the influence of executives’ orientations on strategic behaviors is contingent on the demands posed 
by the environment such that a match between executive orientations and the environment results in 
superior firm performance (Keck, 1997; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Consistent with the 
contingency perspective, the entrainment theory explains how the temporal adjustment of internal 
organizational activities to the temporal features of the environment results in superior adaptation 
and performance (Ancona and Chong, 1996). Entrainment is defined as the process by which 
activity cycles of one system synchronize to those of another, more dominant system (Ancona and 
Chong, 1996; Bluedorn, 2002). The dominant system, typically referred to as the time-giver, sets 
the tempo (i.e., the speed at which the activity is to be performed) of activity cycles to which the 
organization must entrain. The time-giver for an organization is its external environment, and 
effective adjustment to external temporal parameters is central to maximizing firm performance 
(Ancona and Chong, 1996). Successful environmental adaptation requires adjustment of temporal 
milestones, pacing, and sequencing of internal organizational activities to environmentally imposed 
time limits (Gersick, 1994; Sastry, 1997).  
In this sense, executives are closely tied to environmental pacers such as technology, market, 
and competitor cycles, and temporal orientations of executives are likely to affect their ability to 
entrain to external temporal cycles (Ancona et al., 2001; Okhuysen and Waller, 2002). When 
executives’ temporal orientations are compatible with the external temporal demands of the 
environment, executives can accurately detect and monitor external temporal contingencies and 
undertake responsive actions to adjust the internal activities of the firm to the external temporal 
requirements. In contrast, an inconsistency between the two can prompt executives to miscalculate 
environmental temporal demands and to undertake actions that are misaligned with these demands 
(Huy, 2001). Empirical studies have found that a fit between external environmental tempo setters 
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such as hypercompetition (Chen et al., 2010a), dynamism (Nadkarni and Chen, 2014) and 
turbulence (Hambrick Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson, 1993) and managerial orientations maximized 
competitive behaviors and outcomes. 
Drawing on the contingency and entrainment perspectives, we theorize a moderating effect of 
industry velocity (also referred to as industry clockspeed), which reflects the speed or rate at which 
new opportunities emerge and disappear (Davis et al., 2009; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). In the 
competitive context, opportunities embody new sources of gaining competitive advantages (e.g., 
technological and product innovations) and of destroying the advantages of rivals. In high-velocity 
industries, characterized by high rates of new product introductions, technological changes and 
competitive actions, competitive advantages are rapidly created and destroyed. High level of 
competitive activity in the form of new products, mergers and acquisitions, market expansion, and 
strategic alliances compress the temporal window of opportunities and push rivals into accelerating 
the pace of responses (Derfus et al., 2008). As Chen et al. (2010a: 1410) state, “firms engage in an 
escalating series of competitive actions simply to maintain pace with opponents.” Conversely, in 
low-velocity industries, characterized by few and rare changes in products, technologies, and other 
competitive actions, incumbents enjoy longer temporal windows of opportunities and sustainable 
advantages from existing competitive actions (Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007). Because industry 
velocity serves as a critical temporal contingency for incumbent firms, we propose that it will 
moderate the influence of executive temporal depth on competitive aggressiveness as well as the 
influence of competitive aggressiveness on firm performance.  
We propose two broad sets of relationships. First, we expect that executive PTD and FTD will 
exhibit different patterns of relationships with competitive aggressiveness in high and low-velocity 
industries (H1 and H2). Second, we argue that the positive effect of competitive aggressiveness on 
firm performance will be stronger in high-velocity industries than in low-velocity industries (H3). 
HYPOTHESES 
Executive PTD and competitive aggressiveness  
PTD allows for depth of understanding of the historical context and increases the chances of quickly 
 12 
 
finding relevant lessons from a wide range of past actions and outcomes in undertaking present 
behaviors (Bluedorn, 2002; Miller and Porter, 1980; Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). We propose that 
these attributes associated with executive PTD will promote awareness of the competitive 
landscape and in turn increase competitive aggressiveness in low-velocity industries, but inhibit 
competitive awareness and in turn aggressiveness in high-velocity industries. In low-velocity 
industries, where rate of technological and market changes is slow and rivals engage each other in 
similar ways over time, incumbents enjoy competitive advantages over a long period of time (Katila 
et al., 2012; Katila and Chen, 2008; Thomas and D’Aveni, 2009). Competitive interactions patterns 
in low-velocity environments emerge in the long run rather than the short run (D’Aveni et al., 2010; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Because a long executive PTD is associated with “an increased 
ability to detect patterns by making it possible to perceive patterns displaying longer wavelengths” 
(Bluedorn and Martin, 2008: 15), detection of broad historical patterns that are not easily visible in 
the short run, may increase executives’ awareness of hidden threats of rivals’ actions and alert them 
to the necessity and urgency of initiating competitive actions. Such acute awareness of subtle 
opportunities and threats enhances executives’ realization of the need for proactively undertaking a 
large number of new actions and responding in a speedy manner (Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 2001; Chen 
et al., 2007). By considering a longer time horizon, executives can draw on and combine many 
more pieces of information to quickly find many solutions to current competitive problems.    
Conversely, in high-velocity industries, short product and process life cycles and new ways 
of problem solving quickly decreases the usefulness of past knowledge, experiences, and 
advantages (D’Aveni, 1994; Davis et al., 2009; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Because competitive 
interaction patterns in high-velocity industries emerge in the short term rather than the long term 
(D’Aveni et al., 2010), “The past must not be interpreted as a simple recipe for success that can be 
used for a long time” (Bluedorn, 2002: 128). Rather, looking into the distant past may constrain 
executives’ awareness of the short-term changes in the competitive landscape and prompt them to 
miscalculate the temporal window of opportunities in initiating actions and responses (Barringer 
and Bluedorn, 1999; Bluedorn and Martin, 2008). As a result, executives may face considerable 
 13 
 
delays in action-taking and may be left with only a small number of viable competitive action 
alternatives. By ignoring the current happenings and selectively perceiving distant historical events 
that may no longer be relevant, executives with a long PTD are likely to “become increasingly 
removed from other forms of experiences and more vulnerable to change in their environments… 
knowledge about and use of old competencies can inhibit efforts to change” (Levinthal and March, 
1993: 102). Such lack of awareness can foster passivity and hamper quick precipitation of a large 
volume of competitive actions in these contexts (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Marcel et al., 2011; Miller 
and Chen, 1994). Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) found that cumulative past experiences frequently 
constrained executives’ timely competitive responses in the fast changing digital photography 
industry. 
Hypothesis 1(H1): Industry velocity will moderate the relationship between executive PTD 
and competitive aggressiveness such that this relationship will be positive in low-velocity 
industries, but negative in high-velocity industries.  
Executive FTD and competitive aggressiveness 
In low-velocity industries, changes in technologies, competition and customer preferences are 
gradual and subtle, occur over relatively long cycles and are not easily visible in the short term 
(Chen et al., 2010a; Davis et al., 2009; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). We expect that a long FTD 
will positively influence firms’ competitive aggressiveness in these environments, for two reasons. 
First, the competitive dynamics literature has argued that acute awareness of the competitive 
structure allows executives to notice and proactively respond to more opportunities and threats 
ahead of rivals (Chen et al., 2007; Ferrier, 2001). In slow-changing industries, where changes in the 
competitive environment occur gradually and only manifest in the long run (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007), the “pattern detection” ability associated with FTD is likely 
to promote an acute awareness of the competitive environment (Bluedorn and Martin, 2008). A long 
FTD may alert executives to potential developments in the distant future that are not easily visible 
in the short run, allowing them to quickly recognize and respond to more opportunities and threats 
ahead of rivals in a proactive manner, in turn resulting in greater competitive aggressiveness. Katila 
and Chen (2008) found that firms that initiated competitive moves over a longer time horizon 
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engaged in an early search for new opportunities ahead of rivals and precipitated greater number of 
new products.  
Second, strategy research has argued that in low velocity environments where changes are 
slow and can be gauged accurately in advance, an extensive and exhaustive a priori long-term 
strategic analysis can reduce potential barriers to identifying new opportunities as well as to 
coordinating and allocating resources needed to quickly realize multiple opportunities (Forbes, 
2007). In contrast, a short executive FTD may hinder awareness of the long-term trajectories of 
technological, market and competitive changes. Because changes in the short term are few in low-
velocity industries (Davis et al., 2009), a short-term orientation may engender “temporal myopia” 
such that executives fail to proactively predict, prepare for, and act on long-term changes in the 
competitive environment (Chen and Miller, forthcoming; Levinthal and March, 1993: 110). Thus, a 
long executive FTD will facilitate competitive aggressiveness in low-velocity industries, whereas a 
short FTD will hinder aggressiveness.   
In contrast, competitive dynamics scholars increasingly highlight the short time frame of 
competitive advantage in high-velocity industries, where technologies, markets, and competitors 
shift continually and competitive advantages erode very quickly (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Chen et al., 
2010a). In such industries, the advantages of FTD are likely to occur only up to certain levels, 
beyond which a longer FTD can hinder competitive aggressiveness, for several reasons (Barringer 
and Bluedorn, 1999; Bluedorn and Martin, 2008). First, an excessively long FTD “engenders a 
reluctance to deviate from a long-term view of the future despite short-term environmental change.” 
(Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999: 425). Because changes occur frequently and in the short term rather 
than the long term, an overly long FTD may hinder awareness of critical short-term competitive 
changes (Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999), reducing both the speed and volume of viable competitive 
actions. Competitive dynamics research has stressed that flexibility in resource allocation and 
coordination is central to instilling competitive aggressiveness (Chen and Miller, 1995; Ndofor, 
Sirmon and He, 2011).  
Second, unlike low-velocity industries, in which changes occur mainly in the long term, 
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high-velocity industries are characterized by continuous and rapid changes in technological and 
competitive trajectories. Long-term predictions are difficult, and little concrete, detailed information 
about distant future events can be deduced in advance (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). As Bettis and 
Hitt (1995: 12) argued, “forecasting can be useful, but only in certain ways…the time frame of 
forecasting has shrunk, but it is still important.” Because long-term trends are unknowable in such 
environments, a series of nested short- and medium-term decisions lends more flexibility than long-
term oriented options (McGrath and Tschan, 2004). Thus, an excessive executive FTD may hinder 
awareness of the competitive context. 
Together, this research suggests that in high-velocity industries, a very short FTD may give 
rise to temporal myopia, whereas a very long FTD may create rigidities. A moderate temporal depth 
may allow executives to develop tentative and multiple possible futures over a manageable time 
horizon, while continuously refining these futures based on concrete short-term feedback. Such 
balancing of not-too-distant future scenarios with short-term considerations allows executives to 
create an “up-to-date view of the future” without creating rigidities or biases associated with 
forecasting too far into the future (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997: 29).  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Industry velocity will moderate the relationship between executive FTD 
and competitive aggressiveness such that this relationship will be linear positive in low-
velocity industries but inverted-U in high-velocity industries. 
Competitive aggressiveness and firm performance 
Aggressive firms can secure first mover advantages by proactively exploiting more opportunities 
ahead of competitors, can offset the efficacy of rivals’ actions by introducing a large number of new 
actions and can defend their market positions through timely responses to rivals’ actions (Chen et 
al., 2010a; D’Aveni, 1994; Ferrier et al., 1999). Action speed and volume are associated with 
improved firm profitability (Chen et al., 2010a; Hambrick et al., 1996) and market share (Ferrier et 
al., 1999; Hambrick et al., 1996). 
Recent studies have argued that this effect may be stronger in fast-changing environments 
than in slow-changing environments (Chen et al., 2010a). The Austrian school emphasizes that 
firms undertake competitive actions to exploit the opportunity for profit (Kirzner, 1997) and it is 
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critical that firms’ actions are aligned with the window of opportunities embedded in specific 
markets. In fast-changing environments, where competitive advantage is temporary and actions 
become obsolete very quickly, competitive aggressiveness is even more critical to survival and 
success than in slow-changing environments, where competitive advantage may be relatively more 
sustainable and the ramifications of not acting quickly and intensely are less devastating. Chen et al. 
(2010a) found that aggressiveness was more positively related to firm performance in fast-changing 
environments than in slow-changing environments. Together, these arguments suggest that: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Industry velocity will moderate the relationship between competitive 
aggressiveness and firm performance such that this relationship will be more positive in 
high-velocity industries than in low-velocity industries.    
METHODS 
Time frame and sample 
The time frame for our study spanned the years 1995 to 2000 – executive temporal depth data from 
1995 to 1999, competitive aggressiveness data from 1996 to 2000, and year-end firm performance 
data from 1996 to 2000. The economic conditions from 1995 to 2000 were relatively neutral, with 
no exogenous shocks such as the “soft landing” in 1995, September 11 in 2001 and financial crises 
from 2007 to 2008, all of which could disrupt the underlying competitive structures of industries in 
the short term and could confound predictions of incumbent firms’ competitive behaviors (Marcel et 
al., 2011; Rindova et al.,, 2010; Yu et al., 2009).  
The population for our study consisted of large (total assets > $ 1 billion) (John, Lang, and 
Netter, 1992), established (at least 10 years old), and single business (> 70 percent revenue from 
primary business) U.S.-based firms available in the COMPUSTAT database between 1995 and 
2000. Such principal single-business firms have interacted with and survived in their respective 
competitive environments over time and have a coherent competitive agenda (Derfus et al., 2008). 
We excluded firms belonging to industries (based on two-digit SIC code) where competition was 
not clearly observable through publicly available records (e.g., business service industries such as 
advertising agencies) or where measuring competitive actions such as new product introductions 
was difficult (e.g., the finance and insurance industries). We stratified the population of firms 
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satisfying these criteria along industry lines and then randomly selected a representative sample of 
firms from each industry (e.g., Leiponen and Helfat, 2010). The final sample comprised 258 firms 
from 23 industries (15 – 29 percent firms in each industry).  
Data source for executive temporal depth 
We used three archival sources to derive executive temporal depth—letter to shareholders (LTS) in 
the annual reports (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008), management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) in 
the 10-K forms and executive conference calls with analysts (Kimbrough and Louis, 2011). Such 
triangulation provides a comprehensive information set for construction of executive orientations 
and overcomes the biases associated with each archival source (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). 
First, because these documents are published periodically, they are not laden with incomplete 
memory and retrospective biases and are more suitable for longitudinal designs (Nadkarni and Barr, 
2008). Second, the consistent format of these documents based on prescriptions by the security and 
exchange commission (SEC) improves comparability across firms (Miller et al., 1996). Finally, 
these documents are non-intrusive and avoid problems of priming and researcher bias associated 
with eliciting orientations through interviews (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007).  
LTS is an especially useful source for deriving temporal depth of executives because it is 
CEOs’ public addresses of major priorities and themes that are important to the firm, including past 
achievements, current and future challenges, and plans for the future (Osborne, Stubbart, and 
Ramaprasad, 2001). Although LTS are signed and publicly attributed to the CEO, the strategic 
themes included in LTS represent “the socially negotiated perspectives of the CEO and other 
influential executives” (Marcel et al., 2011: 124). As the chief cognizer and chief attention regulator 
of the firm, the CEO must heed competing perspectives of other influential executives and integrate 
these perspectives for decision making. Therefore, LTS reflect the aggregate perceptions of 
executives who play a central role in shaping firm strategies (Marcel et al., 2011). LTS have been 
used to measure executives’ perceptions of their environment (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008), their 
entrepreneurial focus (Cho and Hambrick, 2006), and their temporal focus (Nadkarni and Chen, 
2014; Yadav, Prabhu and Chandy, 2007).  
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The second source--MD&A in 10-K forms--is useful in deriving temporal depth because “it 
is intended to give constituents the opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of 
management by providing both a short and long-term analysis of the business of the company” 
(Bryan, 1997: 286). It is required by law and is monitored by the SEC. Studies have shown that 
executives’ assertions in MD&A are consistent, have strong inter-coder reliability and shape future 
investments made by the firm (Bryan, 1997; Miller et al., 1996).  
Finally, conference calls, where executives comment on past results and highlight the 
implications of current strategies for future financial performance, are becoming an increasingly 
important voluntary disclosure mechanism for firms. They are suitable for constructing executive 
temporal depth because they provide a greater volume of disclosure and emphasize both backward-
looking and forward-looking details (Kimbrough and Louis, 2011). 
We obtained LTS from Mergent Online and MD&A from Edgar database on www.sec.gov. 
Because conference call transcripts are open to the public only after 1999, we were able to get full 
transcripts of conference call for 1999 from the Lexis-Nexis academic database. However, we 
obtained selective executive assertions in the conference calls from 1995 to 1998 quoted in multiple 
published articles. We combined texts from the three sources into a single document separately for 
each year to construct yearly measures of executive PTD and FTD for each firm.  
Measures and controls 
Executive temporal depth.  We used a three-step content analysis procedure to measure executive 
PTD and FTD. In step one, two coders blind to the study hypotheses independently identified 
statements in the two documents that specified exact numerical past and future time horizons
1
: year 
(e.g., 1990, 2001, 2005) and time spans (e.g., six months, two years, decade) (PTD: κ = 0.84, FTD: 
                                                 
1
 For firm-year observations (8.47 percent) with no explicit date or time frame, we followed prior literature and 
computed PTD and FTD from qualitative references of time frame in the executive documents (e.g., Stephan, Liberman, 
and Trope, 2011). Short-term (e.g., now, immediately, quick, shortly, and short-term), medium term (e.g., in the 
medium-term, in the coming years) and long-term (long time from now, long-term) references were assigned the 
average short-term, medium-term and long-term temporal distance in the executive documents of the focal firm for the 
remaining years in our dataset. Moreover, we also confirmed that dropping these qualitatively derived cases did not alter 
the results. 
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κ = 0.80). Following is an example of a clear past time-span in Boeing’s MD&A in 1995:  
“The major focus of development activities over the past three years has been the 777 wide-
body twinjet which entered service in May 1995.” 
The following quote illustrates an explicit future date in Merck’s 1998 LTS: 
“...Today, our medicines span 19 therapeutic categories…by 2002, it may be 24.” 
In step two, we ranked the sentences in ascending order based on the length of the time horizon (in 
years) from the shortest to the longest. In the final step, we computed PTD and FTD based on these 
rank-ordered sentences. Studies using an archival approach to assessing executives’ orientations 
typically employ established scales to develop corresponding archival measures (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, 2007). Accordingly, we used Bluedorn’s (2002) six-item temporal depth index (TDI) 
(PTD: 3 items; FTD: 3 items; α: 0.88) as a basis to compute three measures each of PTD and FTD 
from the rank-ordered sentences of time horizons. The three PTD items in TDI measure the time 
horizons that executives typically consider when thinking about the short-term past, medium-term 
past and long-term past on a 15-choice scale ranging from one day to 25 years. The three FTD items 
in TDI measure the same three time frames and use the same scale.  
Consistent with TDI, we computed six measures of PTD and FTD. The first measure of PTD 
was the longest past date or time span cited in the three documents. Consistent with the long-term 
past item in TDI (Bluedorn, 2002), this measure indicates how far back executives look in 
discussing long-term historical issues. The second measure was the median past date or time span 
cited in the documents. This measure is consistent with the medium past item in TDI (Bluedorn and 
Martin, 2008). The final measure was the shortest past date or time span cited in the documents, 
which corresponds to the short-term past item in TDI (Bluedorn and Martin, 2008). The longest, 
median, and shortest future date or time span cited in the documents corresponded with the three 
FTD items in TDI. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.71 for PTD and 0.78 for FTD. Therefore, we created 
composite measures of executive PTD and FTD by averaging the three individual items. Appendix I 
illustrates how our archival measures of PTD and FTD correspond with the items in TDI.  
We validated the archival measures of PTD and FTD in a separate study of 176 middle 
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managers (70 percent males, mean age = 35 years, mean work experience = 10 years) enrolled in 
four sections of an MBA-level strategic management course at a major Eastern university. Archival 
measures of PTD (α = 0.82) and FTD (α = 0.79) were based on managers’ submission of a three-
page required case analysis write-up assignment of a Harvard business case. The executives also 
completed the TDI scale (α: PTD = 0.88, FTD = 0.85) (Bluedorn, 2002). As expected, archival PTD 
items correlated much more strongly to corresponding PTD items (r = 0.74 – 0.80) in TDI than to 
FTD items in TDI (r = 0.35 to 0.42), and archival FTD items had stronger correlations to the 
respective FTD items (r = 0.71 - 0.78) in TDI than to PTD (r = 0.32 to 0.38) in TDI. These results 
confirm the convergent and discriminant validity as well as reliability of our archival measures. 
Competitive aggressiveness. Following previous studies in competitive dynamics, we used 
structured content analyses of news headlines to identify competitive actions of firms (Chen and 
Miller, 1994; Ferrier, 2001; Rindova et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2009). All news headlines were 
manually coded through a series of steps. First, the coders identified all news headlines for our 
sampled firms between 1996 and 2000 appearing in the Lexis/Nexis online database, which covers 
over 10,000 publications and has been used to identify competitive actions (Rindova et al., 2010). 
Second, two coders evaluated each headline to eliminate duplicate news releases of the same action 
and to determine whether a headline represented a competitive action, defined as “externally-
directed specific and observable competitive moves initiated by a firm to enhance its competitive 
position.” (Ferrier et al., 1999: 378). A total of 20,418 competitive actions were identified by the 
coders (κ = 0.81).  
Following Chen et al. (2010), we created a composite competitive aggressiveness measure 
based on action volume and action speed. Action volume was total number of competitive actions 
initiated by a firm in a given year (Andrevski et al., forthcoming). Action speed was the average 
length of time lag in the focal firm’s actions and rivals’ immediately preceding actions in a given 
year (Derfus et al., 2008). The shorter the time lag, the faster the action speed. We reverse coded the 
speed measure by taking its inverse (Derfus et al., 2008). Factor analysis yielded a single factor 
(Eigen value: 1.74; factor loadings: action volume = 0.93 and action speed = 0.93). Therefore, we 
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calculated a composite measure of competitive aggressiveness by averaging the standardized scores 
of speed and volume. Results based on the two individual dependent variables were consistent with 
those based on the composite measure. We lagged the yearly competitive aggressiveness measure 
behind the executive temporal depth by one year to ensure that executive temporal depth existed 
prior to the initiation of competitive actions, rather than ex post (Marcel et al., 2011).  
Industry velocity. Industry velocity reflects how quickly opportunities appear and disappear 
in an industry (Davis et al., 2009; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). In a competitive context, creation 
and erosion of advantages are tied to how quickly competing firms undertake competitive actions in 
an industry (D’Aveni et al., 2010; Derfus et al., 2008). Firms controlling the most market share (> 
80 percent) dominate the competitive structure of an industry and define the rules of competition for 
their industry (Derfus et al., 2008), thus setting the velocity for their industry. Using the procedures 
we explained earlier, we first identified competitive actions initiated by dominant firms in an 
industry and then computed industry velocity by averaging the competitive actions (total 
competitive actions/ number of firms) of these dominant firms in a given year. Examples of high-
velocity industries are the computer (e.g., Dell), semiconductor (e.g., AMD), telecommunications 
(e.g., ADC) and motion picture and entertainment industries (e.g., AMC). Examples of low-velocity 
industries are metal and plastics (e.g., Ball Corp), office furniture (e.g., Steel Case), tire and rubber 
(e.g., Goodyear) and food packaging (e.g., Crown Holding).   
Firm performance. Following prior competitive dynamics studies (e.g., Derfus et al., 2008), 
we used two accounting measures of performance--return on sales (ROS) and return on assets 
(ROA)—at the end of the same year as the competitive aggressiveness measure. Consistent with 
prior studies, we combined the z-scores of the two measures into a composite measure of firm 
performance (Bromiley and Harris, 2014). Results based on performance data at the end of the year 
following the competitive aggressiveness measure were consistent with the main results. 
Control variables. We used several industry, firm and TMT controls in our analyses. 
Industry concentration (market share controlled by largest firms in an industry) creates entry 
barriers and restricts the intensity of competition in an industry (Ferrier, 2001). In highly 
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concentrated industries, dominant firms are less pressured to engage in aggressive actions. In less 
concentrated industries, with few entry barriers, incumbents have to be aggressive to fend off 
attacks and retaliations from varied competitors. We used a Herfindahl index for industry 
concentration for each two-digit SIC code for each year (Derfus et al., 2008; Ferrier, 2001).  
Industry unpredictability is a key contingency for incumbent firms (Bergh and Lawless, 
1998). In unpredictable industries, where competitive cues are difficult to understand, firms quickly 
try out larger numbers of actions in the hope that at least a few can generate competitive advantages. 
In predictable industries, the competitive recipes are well known and firms can realize advantages 
with a few strategies. We regressed industry values of shipment over 5 years against time (1995–
2000) and used the standard error of the regression coefficient related to a time dummy variable 
divided by the average value of industry’s shipments to compute a standardized index of industry 
unpredictability (Bergh and Lawless, 1998).  
High industry growth (percentage change in firm sales from the previous year to a focal year) 
(Derfus et al., 2008) provides competitive buffers for incumbents to expand sales and maintain their 
market share. However, firms in saturated industries are forced to search continually for new ways 
of competing simply to maintain their market share (Ferrier, 2001).  
Finally, we controlled for industry homogeneity, which captures the degree to which 
incumbents in an industry follow well-defined recipes or patterns of strategic resource allocations 
(Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003). In homogeneous industries, in which the causal relationship 
between strategy and performance is very clear, firms take fewer strategies to obtain a satisfactory 
level of performance. Conversely, in heterogeneous industries, where there is little clarity in 
competitive cues, incumbents quickly undertake many actions so that at least some will 
succeed. We used Zhang and Rajagopalan’s (2003) computation of industry homogeneity based on 
six strategic dimensions (advertising intensity, R&D intensity, plant and equipment newness, 
nonproduction overhead, inventory levels and financial leverage). For each dimension, we 
calculated variance among all the firms in each industry, standardized it for each dimension by the 
sample and multiplied it by -1. We averaged the six standardized dimensions to derive an overall 
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measure of industry homogeneity.  
Smaller firms tend to be flexible, search for new opportunities and challenge the status quo 
(Smith et al., 2001), whereas large firms tend to be bureaucratic and resist competitive pressure 
(Ferrier et al., 1999). We measured firm size by the logarithm of the six-year average of total 
employees (Chen and Miller, 1994). We controlled for slack resources, which provide firms leeway 
to experiment with new actions and manage responses to rivals (Ferrier, 2001). We used three 
measures of slack: current ratio computed as current assets/current liabilities (available slack), debt-
equity ratio (potential slack), and the general and administrative expenses to sales ratio (recoverable 
slack) (Cheng and Kesner, 1997). Past performance increases reinforce the value of existing 
competitive actions, whereas performance decreases promote initiation of new actions (Chen and 
Miller, 1994). We measured the one-year rate of change in ROA and ROS (McDonald, Khanna, and 
Westphal, 2008) immediately preceding competitive aggressiveness data. 
Because greater TMT demographic diversity and size foster diversity of opinions and 
perspectives, broader specialization of skills increase and greater awareness of various alternatives, 
they initiate a large number of complex competitive actions (Ferrier, 2001; Hambrick et al., 1996; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). We defined TMT members as those individuals at the two highest 
levels of management identified in the Dunn and Bradstreet reference book of corporate 
management. TMT heterogeneity was computed by three measures—educational background (Blau 
index; business, science, liberal arts, law, engineering and others), functional background (Blau 
index; engineering/ R&D, finance/accounting, legal, human resources management, manufacturing, 
logistics, purchasing, public relations, and general management) and organizational tenure 
(coefficient of variation: SD/mean) (Ferrier, 2001; Hambrick et al., 1996). TMT composite 
heterogeneity index was the sum of the three standardized individual heterogeneity measures. 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Analyses 
Model testing. We used the generalized least squares (GLS) models, which correct for and provide 
consistent estimates in the presence of groupwise heteroskedasticity, cross group correlation, and 
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within-group auto-correlation (Greene, 2003) in pooled cross-sectional observations such as ours 
(258 firms for five years: 1186 firm-years). The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) results were 
insignificant. So, we used random effects (rather than fixed effects) estimation procedures.  
We used the established stepwise moderation approach (Aiken and West, 1991) to test for 
the interaction effects of executive temporal depth and industry velocity on competitive 
aggressiveness. We entered the controls in model 1 and added the main effects of executive 
temporal depth and industry velocity in model 2 and the hypothesized interaction effects between 
executive temporal depth and industry velocity in model 3. We further tested the main effects of 
executive temporal depth separately for high- and low-velocity industries. Such a median split-
sample approach is recommended for testing non-linear interactions and to better understand bi-
directional moderation (e.g., Morse, Nanda, and Seru, 2011). We used identical procedures to test 
for the moderating effects of industry velocity on the relationship between competitive 
aggressiveness and firm performance.  
We mean centered predictor variables in all the regression models to minimize 
multicollinearity (Aiken and West, 1991). The variance inflation factors for all independent 
variables were below the recommended level of 10. 
Correction for endogeneity. A host of unmodeled factors could influence executive 
temporal depth, competitive aggressiveness and firm performance. To correct for this endogeneity, 
we followed the procedures recommended by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) and Hambrick 
(2007). Accordingly, we regressed executive PTD and FTD on industry dummies (based on two-
digit SIC codes) and firm (past performance, slack resources, and R & D expenditures) variables 
one year prior to executive PTD and FTD variables. Using regression coefficients for these industry 
and firm variables, we calculated each executives’ predicted PTD and FTD score and included these 
values as endogeneity correction control variables in testing the moderation models. 
Results 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations among the study variables. Table 2 and Table 
3 summarize results from the regression analyses. 
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‘Please insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 around here’ 
  In Table 2, the interaction term executive PTD × industry velocity is significant (B = -0.08, 
S.E.= 0.03, p < 0.05). In the split-sample tests, PTD is positively related to competitive 
aggressiveness in low-velocity industries (B = 0.06, S.E.= 0.02, p < 0.05) but negatively related to 
aggressiveness in high-velocity industries (B = -0.16, S.E.= 0.05, p < 0.01). These results support 
H1. 
The value of distant past is evident in this quote from executives of PPG industry (the top 25
 
percent in competitive aggressiveness) in the low-velocity chemical manufacturing industry: 
“The first coat, which provides rust protection, was the result of a chemistry that PPG 
patented 20 years ago and today is the industry standard.” –LTS, 1997. 
 
Executives of Texas Industries, ranked in the bottom 25
 
percent in competitive 
aggressiveness in the low-velocity construction materials industry, cited short-term past orientation:  
“We make our own opportunities for profitable growth - and that's exactly what happened 
last year.”—LTS, 1998 
The assertions of executives in high-velocity industries were the opposite. This quote of Liz 
Claiborne executives (top 25 percent in competitive aggressiveness) explains how focusing on 
“today” rather than the distant past is key in the high-velocity cosmetic industry.  
“...our environment is in constant flux, and effectively managing change requires different 
skills than in the past. Today, we prize the ability not just to sell, but to analyze and 
understand, not just to design and create, but to do so within the context of current customer 
and Consumer preferences...” – LTS, 2000. 
However, executives of Dionex (bottom 25 percent in competitive aggressiveness) in the 
high-velocity Analytical Laboratory Instrument Manufacturing industry, cited the distant past: 
“We continue to improve our products, strengthen our customer relationships and expand 
the applications for our systems. This has been our strategy for the past twenty years and 
will continue to guide our future growth.”—LTS, 1998 
 
The interaction term, FTD square × industry velocity (B = -0.09, S.E.= 0.04, p < 0.01), is 
significant. In the split-sample tests, FTD is positively related to competitive aggressiveness in low-
velocity industries (B = 0.07, S.E.= 0.02, p < 0.01). In high-velocity industries, the positive FTD 
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term (B = 0.15, S.E.= 0.07, p < 0.05) and the negative FTD-square term (B = - 0.11, S.E.= 0.04,  p < 
0.01) support the inverted-U shaped relationship in H2. 
This quote from Alberto-culver executives (top 25 percent in aggressiveness) imply the 
importance of a long-term future horizon in the low-velocity household consumer industry:  
“We continue to aggressively prune underperforming brands and stock keeping units from 
our portfolio in order to concentrate on products that have the greatest long-term potential 
for the company… We have been able to achieve strong top and bottom line growth while 
continuing to make substantially increased marketing investments that will benefit our 
business in the long run.”— LTS, 1997 
 
Conversely, executives of Tredegar, a firm low in competitive aggressiveness (bottom 25 
percent) in the low-velocity plastic films industry, exhibited a short-term future orientation.  
“Looking ahead, Tredegar's immediate challenge is to accelerate growth… Building value 
in today's world depends on our ability to use information and knowledge to drive 
innovation”—LTS, 1997, 1998 
 
However, assertions of executives in high-velocity industries were the opposite. Executives 
of Western Digital (top 25 percent in competitive aggressiveness) explained the value of 
intermediate FTD in adapting to market changes in the high-velocity computer hard disk industry:  
“…With the vast and rapidly growing market before us, our challenge is to execute properly 
the plans we've developed to serve it. Western Digital continues to have adequate capital 
resources for the near- and intermediate-term...”— LTS, 1999. 
 
Executives from Biomet inc., a medical device manufacturing company low on competitive 
aggressiveness (bottom 25 percent) depicted a long-term future orientation: 
“As we look forward to our next twenty years of growth, Biomet is committed to expanding 
its global market share by improving upon the high quality products and services offered to 
customers and patients throughout the world”—LTS, 1997 
In Table 3, competitive aggressiveness relates positively to firm performance (B = 0.14, 
S.E.= 0.03, p < 0.001) for the full sample as well as for the low- (B = 0.14, S.E.= 0.06, p < 0.05) 
and high-velocity groups (B = 0.11, S.E.= 0.03, p < 0.01). Industry velocity × competitive 
aggressiveness has a positive effect on firm performance (B = 0.05, S.E.= 0.03, p < 0.1). Thus, H3 
is marginally supported. 
DISCUSSION 
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Theoretical implications 
We built on and extended research on time in competitive dynamics by examining how executive 
temporal orientation interacts with industry velocity in shaping competitive aggressiveness. This 
study yielded two broad sets of results. First, it illustrates that the role of executive temporal depth 
in shaping competitive aggressiveness is contingent on industry velocity. Executive PTD promoted 
aggressiveness in low-velocity industries but hindered it in high-velocity industries, whereas FTD 
promoted aggressiveness in low-velocity industries but had an inverted-U relationship in high-
velocity industries. Second, PTD and FTD showed different relationship patterns to aggressiveness 
in the two contexts. In low-velocity contexts, both PTD and FTD enhanced aggressiveness. 
However, in high-velocity contexts, PTD hampered aggressiveness, but FTD enhanced it up to a 
point, beyond which it was dysfunctional. These results specify the environmental boundary 
conditions of executive temporal orientation in shaping competitive aggressiveness and highlight 
the importance of considering temporal direction (past versus future) in addition to time horizons. 
These results have two key implications for research on competitive dynamics.  
First, competitive dynamics research has explained how industry-level temporal forces such as 
hypercompetition (D’Aveni et al., 2010), velocity (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), dynamism (Davis 
et al., 2009), uncertainty (Chen and Miller, 1994) and nascent versus established industries (Chen et 
al., 2010b) serve as time givers and determine the temporariness or sustainability of advantages 
enjoyed by incumbents from their competitive actions. Firms that successfully match the temporal 
aspects of their micro competitive actions to the temporal features of the environment enjoy 
superior performance, whereas firms that fail to adapt to their environment face major losses 
(Ancona et al., 2001; Davis et al., 2009; Katila et al., 2012). Our results add to this body of research 
by suggesting a third temporal force—executives’ temporal orientation. Our results demonstrate 
that innate temporal orientations of executives are central to promoting competitive adaptation 
through speedy precipitation of a large volume of competitive actions. Thus, this study highlights 
the importance of subjective perspective of time in understanding competitive phenomena.  
At the same time, the effects of executive temporal orientation are contingent on macro 
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temporal forces—industry velocity. Our results suggest that executive PTD and FTD orientations 
that promote competitive aggressiveness and in turn superior performance in high-velocity 
environments but may be dysfunctional in low-velocity environments and vice versa. An important 
implication of these moderation results is that not only is executive temporal orientation an 
important force in shaping temporally rooted competitive behaviors, but also that executive 
temporal orientation cannot be considered in isolation of macro temporal features of the 
environment. Rather, temporal features of the macro industrial environments serve as boundary 
conditions for the relationship between executive temporal orientation and firm behaviors. This 
result is especially notable because research on objectively-based macro temporal forces and 
subjective perspective of time has progressed along independent lines. Our results suggest that the 
two perspectives are complementary and together provide a more complete understanding of how 
time manifests in competitive behaviors. The integration of macro, micro and subjective temporal 
forces presented in this study is consistent with the entrainment theory, which suggests that the 
degree of “temporal fit” between managers’ executive temporal orientations and external clocks set 
by the environmental factors promotes effective adaptation, whereas a misfit between the two 
hinders adaptation (Ancona and Chong, 1996; Ancona et al., 2001).    
The results of this study constitute a first step in explicating the interaction between 
subjective temporal forces and macro (environmental) factors in predicting competitive behaviors 
and firm performance. Future studies could further explore the mechanisms through which 
executive temporal orientation promotes or hinders competitive behaviors in high- and low-velocity 
environments. Several streams of research are pertinent in theorizing these mediating mechanisms 
this regard. Literature on temporal aspects of strategic decision-making is particularly relevant in 
this regard. Because executive temporal orientations represent innate and relatively stable temporal 
tendencies (Bluedorn, 2002; Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999), they are likely to shape temporal heuristics, 
pacing and sequencing rules described in the strategic decision making literature (Bingham and 
Eisenhardt, 2011; Gersick, 1994; Sastry, 1997). Because different environments necessitate 
different temporal rules and heuristics, the relationship of executive PTD and FTD to aggressive 
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behaviors may be mediated by these unique context-relevant rules and heuristics. For example, a 
short temporal depth is associated with spontaneity and flexibility, whereas a long temporal depth 
promotes systematic preparation for the future (Bluedorn, 2002; Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). Short 
PTD and medium FTD may dispose executives to develop loose and flexible temporal ordering and 
sequencing rules in undertaking firm strategies, all of which are suitable in dynamic environments. 
In contrast, long PTD and FTD may prompt executives to develop in advance a complete, clearly 
ordered map of all future choice points that are pertinent to undertaking aggressive behaviors in 
stable environments.  
Another potential mediation mechanism is the notion of perceived competitive tension 
(Chen et al., 2007). For example, in high velocity industries, executives with low PTD and medium 
FTD may experience higher competitive tension and are more aggressive in response to what they 
believe will happen in future, not what happened in the past. As such, PTD and FTD could trigger 
different forms of perceived competitive tension: reflective competitive tension derived by what 
happened in the past vs anticipatory competitive tension derived by beliefs of what might happen in 
the future. These reflective vs anticipatory competitive tension will enhance or hamper competitive 
aggressiveness.  
Future studies could combine insights on executives temporal depth from this study with 
strategic decision making literature and perceived competitive tension literature to pose this 
question: How do executive temporal orientations influence competitive behaviors differently in 
different environments? Thus, the temporal mechanisms specified in the strategic decision making 
literature and different forms of perceived competitive tension could serve as potential mediators in 
environment-specific relationships between executive temporal orientation and firm actions.  
Second, prior research has considered only future time horizons (Das, 1987; Laverty, 1996; 
Marginson and MacCaulay, 2008; Souder and Bromiley, 2012). We demonstrated the role of both 
past and future time horizons in shaping competitive behaviors. Interestingly, the distinction 
between past and future time horizons seems pertinent to understanding competitive behaviors in 
high-velocity environments but not in low-velocity environments. Substantively, the relationships 
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of executive PTD and FTD were consistent in low-velocity industries, but PTD and FTD exhibited 
different patterns of relationships in high-velocity industries. Whereas a short PTD yielded superior 
competitive aggressiveness and firm performance, a moderate FTD maximized competitive 
aggressiveness and firm performance in high-velocity industries. These results are consistent with 
the temporal depth literature, which argues that the information processing mechanisms associated 
with PTD (deeper understanding and learning) are distinct from those associated with FTD 
(visionary thinking and pattern detection) (Bluedorn, 2002). Bluedorn and Martin (2008) found that 
PTD and FTD of entrepreneurs related differently to perceived temporal flexibility, work stress and 
preference for working fast. Our results suggest that the differences between PTD and FTD are 
pronounced in some environments (high velocity) but not in others (low velocity). 
Limitations and conclusions 
Our study is bound by some limitations. Our findings based on single business firms may not apply 
to diversified firms facing multi-market competition. Similarly, the five-year time frame of our 
study captured a unique time period for the nature of competitive interactions among firms and this 
time period corresponding to our results limits generalizability of our findings. 
In conclusion, this study underscores the substantive value of executive temporal orientation 
in understanding competitive behaviors and firm performance in different industry contexts. We 
hope that the promising results of this study stimulate further research on executive temporal 
orientation, firm behaviors and outcomes. Such research could improve our understanding of how 
time manifests in competitive behaviors and firm strategies. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
 a 
 
a 
Correlations with value greater than |0.06| are significant at p <0.05 
b Logarithm transformation 
1 Executive PTD: Executive Past Temporal Depth 
2 Executive FTD: Executive Future Temporal Depth 
  N=1186 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Controls                
1. Firm size b 3.19 0.74 1             
2. Organizational slack 0.97 1.33 -0.18 1            
3. Past performance change 0.02 0.20 -0.00 -0.05 1           
4. TMT size 6.18 1.18 0.14 -0.07 -0.02 1          
5. TMT heterogeneity 0.01 0.70 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.29 1         
6. Industry concentration 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.04 1        
7. Industry unpredictability 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.57 1       
8. Industry growth 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.05 0.06 0.12 1      
9. Industry homogeneity 0.10 0.51 0.15 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.23 0.10 0.06 1     
Study variables                
10. Industry velocity 26.72 29.70 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.12 -0.08 -0.20 -0.60 1    
11. Executive PTD 1 4.97 2.57 -0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 0.09 1   
12. Executive FTD 2 4.88 3.01 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.18 1  
13. Competitive aggressiveness -0.05 0.55 0.26 -0.00 0.07 0.10 0.07 -0.03 -0.00  -0.00 -0.20 0.15 -0.01 0.02 1 
14. Performance  0.00 0.94 -0.07 0.07 0.25 -0.00 -0.10 0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.12 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.15 
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 Table 2. Moderated regression results for executive temporal depth, industry velocity and competitive 
aggressiveness  
 
Variables 
Full sample 
 Split sample 
 Low velocity  High velocity 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept  -0.06 -0.04 -0.00   -0.15  0.28  -0.01  0.15  
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.08)   (0.10)  (0.17)   (0.19) (0.20)  
Control variables 
    
 
  
 
  
Firm size    0.30***   0.30***   0.30***    0.22***   0.20***    0.53***  0.53*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.07) (0.07) 
Organization slack  0.05   0.04   0.05+    0.00   0.01    0.24  0.20 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.19) (0.20) 
Past performance   0.08**   0.08**  0.07**    0.01   0.00   0.24***  0.24*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.07) (0.07) 
TMT size  0.05+   0.05   0.04  -0.02  -0.01    0.12*  0.11* 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.05) (0.05) 
TMT heterogeneity  0.03   0.03   0.03    0.07*   0.07**   0.00 -0.01 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.05) (0.05) 
Concentration  0.00  0.00   0.00   -0.01  -0.02   0.06   0.11 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)   (0.04)  (0.03)   (0.19)  (0.20) 
Unpredictability  0.00   0.00  0.00   0.03   0.03    0.01  -0.01 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)   (0.03)  (0.03)    (0.16)  (0.16) 
Growth   0.01   0.01  0.01    0.00   0.00     0.03   0.03 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.09)  (0.09) 
Homogeneity -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.19***  -0.12* -0.10*   -0.27*  -0.34** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05)   (0.11)  (0.12) 
PTD Endogeneity 
control  
 0.04  0.04   0.04    0.02   0.05   -0.20+   0.27+ 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)   (0.06)  (0.05)    (0.12)  (0.14) 
FTD Endogeneity 
control  
-0.04  -0.05 -0.05   0.03   0.00   -0.13  -0.18 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)   (0.05)  (0.04)    (0.10)  (0.11) 
 
Independent variables 
   
 
  
 
  
Velocity 
 
 0.04   0.14*   
 
 0.80**  
 
  -0.11 
  
(0.06)  (0.07)   
 
(0.28)   
 
  (0.09) 
Executive PTD  
 
-0.04  -0.05+   
 
 0.06*   
 
  -0.16** 
  
(0.03)  (0.03)   
 
(0.02)   
 
  (0.05) 
Executive FTD  0.07+   0.10*   
 
 0.07**   
 
   0.15* 
  
(0.04)  (0.04)   
 
(0.02)   
 
  (0.07) 
FTD square a 
 
-0.02  -0.05*   
  
 
 
  -0.11** 
  
(0.02)  (0.02)   
  
 
 
  (0.04) 
Velocity × PTD b 
  
-0.08*   
  
 
  
   
(0.03)   
  
 
  Velocity × FTD b 
  
 0.05   
  
 
  
   
(0.05)   
  
 
  Velocity × FTD b 
square  
-0.09**  
(0.04)  
  
  
   
 
  
 
  
    
 
  
 
  Years dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Log likelihood  -1620.6  -1628.1 -1627.4  -568.1 -564.2   -932.0  -930.3 
N c  1186   1186   1186    593    593     593    593  
Two tailed; ***p<0.001, **p < 0.01,*p < 0.05, + p <0.1; standard errors in parentheses 
a The inverted-U relationships of executive PTD and FTD to competitive aggressiveness did not hold in low velocity industries.  
b We tested the three-way interactions between velocity, PTD, FTD/FTD square. These three-way interactions were insignificant. 
c The total number of observations used in regression models was smaller than original sample size (N=1290) due to missing 
values of the independent, dependent, and control variables.  
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Table 3. Moderated regression results for competitive aggressiveness, industry velocity, and firm performance  
Variables 
Full sample 
 Split sample 
  
Low velocity 
 
High velocity 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 4 Model 5 
 
Model 6 Model 7 
          Intercept -0.02  -0.01  -0.03  
 
-0.17  -0.28  
 
0.14  0.14  
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
(0.12) (0.26) 
 
(0.15) (0.15) 
Controls 
 
 
         Firm size -0.03  -0.07* -0.06* 
 
-0.04  -0.07  
 
0.08+ 0.03  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Slack resource  0.08**  0.07* 0.07* 
 
 0.02   0.02  
 
 0.79***  0.74*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.11) (0.11) 
Past performance  0.25***  0.24*** 0.24*** 
 
 0.24***  0.24*** 
 
 0.23***  0.21*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 
TMT size  0.04   0.03  0.03  
 
 0.01   0.01  
 
 0.09*  0.08+ 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
TMT heterogeneity -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.13*** 
 
-0.05  -0.06  
 
-0.19*** -0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
Concentration  0.12**  0.12** 0.12** 
 
 0.14**  0.14** 
 
-0.21  -0.23  
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.14) (0.14) 
Unpredictability  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
 
-0.01  -0.01  
 
-0.02  -0.02  
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.13) (0.13) 
Growth  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  
 
-0.02  -0.01  
 
-0.08  -0.08  
  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Homogeneity  -0.04    0.00 0.00 
 
 0.03   0.05  
 
-0.05  -0.03  
 
 (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.06) (0.07) 
 
(0.09) (0.1) 
Independent variables 
 
 
 
         Velocity 
 
0.03  0.03  
  
-0.22  
  
-0.01  
 
 
(0.06) (0.06) 
  
(0.41) 
  
(0.07) 
Competitive aggressiveness 
 
 0.14***  0.11*** 
  
 0.14* 
  
 0.11** 
 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
  
(0.06) 
  
(0.03) 
Velocity × aggressiveness 
  
 0.05+ 
      
   
(0.03) 
      
          
          Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Log likelihood  1637.9  1631.6  1632.9 
 
 798.7  797.9 
 
 824.6  824.0 
N a  1186  1186  1186 
 
 593  593 
 
 593  593 
Two tailed;***p<0.001,**p < 0.01,*p < 0.05, + p < 0.1; standard errors in parentheses 
a The total number of observations used in regression models was smaller than original sample size (N=1290) due to missing 
values in the independent, dependent, and control variables. 
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Appendix I Derivation of archival measures of PTD and FTD based on temporal depth index  
 
  TDI items a Corresponding archival measure in our study 
PTD 
When I think about things that happened recently, I 
usually think about things that happened this long ago 
The shortest time span between the past date cited in combined 
text and the date of the combined text from LTS, MD&A and 
Conference call transcripts 
When I think about things that happened a middling 
time ago, I usually think about things that happened this 
long ago 
The median time span between the past date cited in combined 
text and the date of the combined text from LTS, MD&A and 
Conference call transcripts 
When I think about things that happened a long time 
ago, I usually think about things that happened this long 
ago 
The longest time span between the past date cited in combined 
text and the date of the combined text from LTS, MD&A and 
Conference  
FTD 
When I think about the short-term future, I usually think 
about things this far ahead 
The shortest future time span between the future date cited in the 
combined text and the date of the combined text from LTS, 
MD&A and Conference call transcripts 
When I think about the mid-term future, I usually think 
about things this far ahead 
The median future time span between the future date cited in the 
combined text and the date of the combined text from LTS, 
MD&A and Conference call transcripts 
When I think about the long-term future, I usually think 
about things this far ahead 
The longest future time span between the future date cited in the 
combined text and the date of the combined text from LTS, 
MD&A and Conference call transcripts 
 
a: Each item has 15 options: One day, One week, Two weeks, One month, Three months, Six months, Nine months, One year, Three years, Five 
years, Ten years, Fifteen years, Twenty years, Twenty-five years 
 
 
 
